Multi-tenant scoping
Marking an entity multi-tenant adds a tenant_id column, auto-injects
it on writes, filters reads by it, and scopes lifecycle events to it.
The tenant ID is resolved server-side from the authenticated context —
never from a client-sent header.
Quickstart
app.Entity("posts", framework.EntityConfig{ Scope: &framework.ScopeConfig{MultiTenant: true}, Fields: []schema.Field{ {Name: "title", Type: schema.String, Required: true}, },})// Add the middleware once on the app. The argument is ignored —// no header is ever read (see "How tenants get into the request"):app.Use(framework.TenantMiddleware(""))
Once both are wired:
INSERTauto-populatestenant_idfrom the request context.SELECTaddsWHERE tenant_id = $tenant.UPDATE/DELETEcannot touch rows owned by other tenants.- The SSE
_eventsstream filters to the requester's tenant.
How tenants get into the request
func TenantMiddleware(header string) func(http.Handler) http.HandlerThe middleware never reads a request header. The header parameter
is ignored — it is retained only so call sites from the era when the
header was consulted keep compiling. Trusting a client-sent header
would let any caller impersonate any tenant by setting one header, so
the tenant is resolved exclusively from server-side authenticated
state.
What the middleware does: when the authenticated context resolves a
tenant (handler.GetTenant, a non-empty string), it copies that value
to the tenant context that CRUD scoping reads. Framework auth paths
that resolve a tenant set it via a server-side lookup keyed on the
authenticated subject — grant-authenticated embeds do this through
their tenant resolver; nothing the request carried chooses the tenant.
Downstream handlers and hooks call framework.GetTenantID(ctx) to
read it.
If your tenants come from JWT claims, a subdomain, a session lookup,
or anywhere else, write your own middleware that calls
framework.SetTenantID(ctx, id) — the framework only cares that the
context value is set.
Custom tenant column
The tenant column defaults to tenant_id. To use a different name, set
Scope.TenantField on the entity — it's the single source of the column name
across injection, auto-migrate, and the CRUD insert/scope/filter paths:
app.Entity("docs", framework.EntityConfig{ Scope: &framework.ScopeConfig{ MultiTenant: true, TenantField: "org_id", // injected, created, written, and scoped by this column }, Fields: []schema.Field{{Name: "title", Type: schema.String}},})
A TenantField that isn't a valid SQL identifier fails loud at
definition time. If you configure tenancy via tenant.WithMultiTenant(ent,
TenantConfig{Field: "org_id"}), the Field flows into TenantField
automatically.
The standalone helpers
framework.ApplyTenantFilter/InjectTenantID
always use the defaulttenant_idcolumn (they have no entity context).
A customTenantFieldis honored by the automatic CRUD scoping, which is
the path you normally use — reach for the standalone helpers only with the
default column.
Configuration
TenantConfig / DefaultTenantConfig() carry the tenant column and
AutoScope. Header is a legacy field retained for API compatibility
— it is not read anywhere, and setting it changes no behavior. The
defaults are:
| Field | Default |
|---|---|
Field | tenant_id |
Header | X-Tenant-ID (legacy, ignored) |
AutoScope | true |
AutoScope=false lets you read across tenants from admin routes
while still writing scoped — handy for support/admin tooling.
Helpers
framework.SetTenantID(ctx, id)— stash a tenant on context.framework.GetTenantID(ctx)— read it back; returns""when not
set.framework.InjectTenantID(data, ctx)— setdata["tenant_id"]
from context. Used internally on writes; expose-yourself helper for
custom endpoints that bypass the auto path.framework.ApplyTenantFilter(qb, tenantID)— add
WHERE tenant_id = $1to a query builder.
Audit log
When WithAuditLog is enabled, every audit row stamps the current
tenant into its own tenant_id column, resolved from
tenant.GetTenantID(ctx) at write time. This keeps the audit trail
scoped per tenant rather than mixing all tenants' rows in one table —
scope your audit queries with WHERE tenant_id = $1. The stamp does
not require the audited entity to be MultiTenant; any tenant present
in the request context (e.g. set by your auth middleware) is recorded.
See audit-log for the schema and query examples.
Cross-tenant access
Secure by default (since the tenant-gate change). A MultiTenant
entity served over HTTP with no tenant id in the request context is
refused with 401 — on every operation (list, get, create, update,
delete, batch, stream, SSE) and through the in-process CRUD API. A
missing tenant context can no longer silently return or mutate every
tenant's rows.
BREAKING: earlier versions failed open — an empty tenant id
disabled filtering and returned all tenants' rows. If you relied on
"admin routes just omit the header to see across tenants", you must
now opt in explicitly (below). Auto-scope by tenant id is unchanged
for the normal request path.
To read or write across tenants deliberately (admin tooling), mark the
context with tenant.AllowCrossTenant — server-side only, never
from a client-controlled header:
<!-- gofastr:compile
import "github.com/DonaldMurillo/gofastr/framework/tenant"
import "net/http"
var r *http.Request
-->
// inside an admin-gated handler / middleware, AFTER your own role check:ctx := tenant.AllowCrossTenant(r.Context())r = r.WithContext(ctx)// CRUD on this request now spans every tenant (scope helpers no-op on// the empty tenant id) instead of being refused with 401.
There is no built-in role check linking permissions to tenant scope.
AllowCrossTenant only lifts the tenant requirement; you must still
gate the route with RequirePermission (or equivalent) so only the
right role can reach it. Creating a row while cross-tenant with no
tenant id is still refused — there's no tenant to stamp it with.
Schema implications
When you declare MultiTenant: true, framework.AutoMigrate adds the
column. If you migrated the table manually, add:
ALTER TABLE postsADD COLUMN tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '';CREATE INDEX posts_tenant_idx ON posts (tenant_id);
The index is recommended on any table that filters by tenant_id on
every read.
Common mistakes
- Adding
MultiTenant: trueto an existing entity without
backfillingtenant_id. Existing rows have empty string and
match every tenant. Backfill before flipping the flag. - Setting the tenant from a client-controlled value. A request
body field, a plain header, anything the caller sends is trivially
spoofable. Resolve the tenant server-side (a verified JWT claim, a
session lookup) and callSetTenantIDfrom your own middleware. - Forgetting tenant resolution. Auto-scope only fires when the
context has a tenant — without one every request now gets a401
(secure by default), not silent cross-tenant access. Seed the tenant
from your auth layer or your own middleware, or set
tenant.AllowCrossTenantdeliberately on admin routes. - Cross-tenant joins via
?include=. If both parent and child
are multi-tenant, includes scope on the parent's tenant only.
Non-multi-tenant child entities are returned unfiltered — model
carefully.